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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE NUREMBERG JUDGMENT
Whitney R. Harris*
The judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg, Germany, was handed down on September 30-October 1, 1946,
approximately a quarter of a century ago.1
This international judicial body, created ad hoc for the purpose,
ruled upon criminal offenses charged by the allied powers in World
War II against leaders of Nazi Germany. In addition to determin-
ing the guilt or innocence of the accused, the Tribunal laid down
principles of international law which it hoped would contribute to
the protection of human rights in war and to the overall protection
of humanity against war.
As Mr. Henry L. Stimson declared at that time:2
The law made effective by the trial at Nuremberg is righteous law
long overdue. It is in just such cases as this one that the law becomes
more nearly what Mr. Justice Holmes called it: 'the witness and external
deposit of our moral life.'
With the judgment of Nuremberg we at last reach to the very core
of international strife, and we set a penalty not merely for war crimes,
but for the very act of war itself, except in self-defense....
International law is still limited by international politics, and we
must not pretend that either can live and grow without the other. But
in the judgment of Nuremberg there is affirmed the central principle
of peace-that the man who makes or plans to make aggressive war is
a criminal. A standard has been raised to which Americans, at least,
must repair; for it is only as this standard is accepted, supported, and
enforced that we can move onward to a world of law and peace.
In the twenty-five years which have passed since the Tribunal
handed down its opinion, there has been no general war between
major powers. But war has not ceased to exist. There have been con-
stant battles among the world's smaller nations with a limited in-
volvement of the major powers. The judgment of the Tribunal has
* A.B. Washington, 1933; LL.B., U. Cal. 1936; Former trial counsel on the staff
of the United States Chief of Counsel in the trial of the major German war criminals
at Nuremberg, Germany; Author of TYRANNY ON TRIAL, THE EVIDENCE AT NUREM-
BERG, 1954.
1 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMNALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 366 (Secretariat of the Tribunal, pub. 1947-49). [hereinafter cited as
TMWC.]
2 H. L. STrMsoN & McG. BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 590-91
(1948) [hereinafter cited as STIMSON].
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thus not eliminated the resort to war for the settlement of disputes
among nations, but it has contributed to a growing acceptance of theprinciple that war must become an impermissible means of adjusting
such disputes.
THE CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
An agreement was signed in London on August 8, 1945, by thegovernments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the
Soviet Union for the prosecution and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis.' The agreement called for the
creation of an International Military Tribunal with jurisdiction to
try war criminals whose offenses had no particular geographical lo-
cation.4 The constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of the Tri-bunal were set out in an annexed Charter which constituted an inte-
gral part of the agreement.5
Provision was made for the adherence of other governments,
and by the time the judgment of the Tribunal was handed down,
nineteen other countries had joined in the agreement.' By its terms,
the agreement was to remain in force for one year and thereafter,
subject to the right of any signatory to terminate it upon one month's
notice.' No such notice of termination has ever been given. The
agreement thus remains viable as a declararion of human rights,
binding upon the signatory and adhering nations. Moreover, those
states which were parties to the agreement at the time the Tribunal
rendered its opinion are undoubtedly estopped from disavowing the
principles of law which they invoked against the Nuremberg defen-
dants.
By an Executive Order of May 2, 1945, President Harry S.
Truman designated Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson, a member of the
Supreme Court of the United States, as the representative of the
United States in drafting the protocol, and as its chief counsel inpreparing and prosecuting charges of atrocities and war crimes
against such of the leaders of the European Axis powers as the
United States might agree, with any of the United Nations, to bring
to trial before an international military tribunal. Justice Jackson
signed the London Agreement for the United States pursuant to this
authority.'
3 TMWC, supra note 1, at 8-9.
4 Id. at 8.
5 Id. at 10-18.
6 Id. at 9.
7 Id.
8 W. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL 11 (1954) [hereinafter cited as HAsIS].
9 TMWC, supra note 1, at 9.
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The Charter, contained in the London agreement, defined
crimes which came within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Those for
which individual responsibility was to be assessed included crimes
against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.'
0 Although
the offenses within these categories were broadly stated, the Tri-
bunal observed in its judgment that: "The Charter is not an arbi-
trary exercise of power on the part of the victorious Nations, but in
the view of the Tribunal, as will be shown, it is the expression of in-
ternational law existing at the time of its creation; and to that extent
is itself a contribution to international law.""
The Tribunal observed further that "the making of the Charter
was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries
to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered .... ,,12 It
was also a covenant, mutually agreed upon, by the signatory and
adhering nations.'" In his opening address to the General Assembly
of the United Nations, only thirty days after the judgment of the
Tribunal, Mr. Warren R. Austin, the chief delegate of the United
States to the General Assembly, stated: "Besides being bound by the
law of the United Nations Charter, twenty-three nations, members
of this Assembly, including the United States, Soviet Russia, the
United Kingdom, and France, are also bound by the law of the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal."' 4 On December 11, 1946, the
General Assembly expressly affirmed "the principles of international
law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the
judgment of the Tribunal."' 5 Commenting upon the importance of
this resolution, Dr. C. A. Pompe wrote that it "signified a recog-
nition that judicial not political action had been taken, that Nurem-
berg did not signify an ephemerical, opportunistic deviation from the
established rules, but a permanent, irrevocable change, and that it
was not a unilateral provision but general law, binding the whole
community, which had been applied."'"
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
The principles of law set out in the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal and the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, as
construed and applied by the Tribunal in its Judgment of September
30-October 1, 1946, are now binding upon the world community.
What, then, are the basic human rights which these principles recog-
10 Id. at 11.
11 Id. at 218.
12 Id.
13 HARRms, supra note 8, at 560.
14 New York Times, Oct. 31, 1946, at 12, col. 7.
15 1 U.N. GAOR 1144 (1946).
16 C. PomPE, AcoRassmW WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRImE 317 (1953).
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nize and affirm, and which are entitled to protection under inter-
national law?
A. An Individual Charged with Crime under International Law
is Entitled to a Fair Trial
For those accustomed to constitutional guarantees against de-privation of life or liberty for alleged crime it seems implausible thatproposals could have been advanced for the use of executive, rather
than judicial, action against those charged with the commission of
crimes against peace, and related offenses, during World War II.Yet, before enactment of the Charter of the International MilitaryTribunal, powerful voices were heard, proposing that the "guilty"be shot, out of hand, without benefit of trial.
The Judicial Process
Justice Jackson reported in his Introduction to Tyranny on
Trial:
Stalin, according to Churchill's account, proposed to line up and
shoot fifty thousand high-ranking German leaders. Churchill says he in-dignantly refused. But Judge Samuel Rosenman, who was in Europerepresenting President Roosevelt when the latter died, reported of theBritish officials in his Working with Roosevelt: 'They wanted to takethe top Nazi criminals out and shoot them without warning one morn-ing and announce to the world that they were dead.' Churchill, he says,
agreed, for he thought long-drawn-out trials would be a mistake.17
Many Americans, were similarly opposed to giving the Germanleaders the benefit of a trial. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthauproposed to President Roosevelt "that a list should be made ofGerman arch-criminals-men whose obvious guilt was generally
recognized by the United Nations-and that upon capture andidentification these men should be shot at once."' Even the ChiefJustice of the United States Supreme Court Harlan Stone, in writing
about "the power of the victor over the vanquished" observed: "It
would not disturb me greatly if that power were openly and frankly
used to punish the German leaders for being a bad lot, but it dis-turbs me some to have it dressed up in the habiliments of the com-
mon law and the Constitutional safeguards to those charged with
crime."' 9
In the end, the advocates of the judicial process did prevail,primarily, as Justice Jackson noted, because of the strong support of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt:
17 HARRIs, supra note 8, at xxxii.
18 STimsoN, supra note 2, at 584.
19 Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: The Views of Chief Justice Stone, 67HARV. L. REv. 193, 210-11 (1954).
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President Roosevelt had steadily and insistently favored a speedy
but fair trial for these men, fearful that if they were punished without
public proof of their crimes and opportunity to defend themselves there
would always remain a doubt of their guilt that might raise a myth of
martyrdom. Secretary Stimson, and those associated with him in the
War Department, had strongly supported President Roosevelt's policy
of no punishment except for those proved guilty at a genuine good-faith
trial. They gave unfailing support to me in trying to carry out that pol-
icy. The British and French were persuaded eventually to that view
and did their utmost to co-operate in carrying the difficult task to suc-
cessful execution. The Soviet reluctantly joined. Rosenman says that
later Churchill acknowledged to him, 'Now that the trials are over, I
think the President was right and I was wrong.'
20
Thus it was that the leaders of Nazi Germany were brought to
trial for crimes allegedly committed by them in World War II. They
were accorded rights of accused persons under both the common
and civil law systems.21 The fairness of the proceedings has never
been seriously challenged. Of the twenty-two defendants actually
brought to trial, all of whom had been indicted as principal con-
spirators in the Hitler tyranny, three were acquitted by the Tribunal,
seven received varying terms of imprisonment, and only twelve were
given a death sentence.22 The fact that the hand of justice could be
so fairly laid upon those charged with crimes of such unsurpassing
scope and brutality is testimony to the validity of the principle of
trial before a determination, of guilt and assessment of punishment.
23
Need for an Impartial Tribunal
The right to trial is still imperfect while the victor retains the
power to establish the tribunal and to prosecute the accused under
its own procedures. The power of the victor to try the vanquished
is not part of the precedent of Nuremberg. In 1945, there was simply
no other course. At that time no international judicial body existed
which was competent to hear the cases against the German war
criminals. As Justice Jackson observed, "Only the naive or those
forgetful of conditions in 1945 would contend that we could have
20 HARRis, supra note 8, at xxxiv.
21 Defendants were permitted to testify in their own defense under oath (a right
to which the accused is entitled at common law) and to make a closing unsworn
statement (a right to which the accused is entitled at civil law). Id. at 1.
22 Id. at 478-81.
23 When actual hostilities cease, any further acts against enemy persons
should be taken only in accordance with legal process. The decision of the
Tribunal makes clear that where the legal process is used to determine re-
sponsibility of persons accused of crime in international law it must accord
with the basic requisites of fair trial generally observed by courts-martial,
military commissions, and similar military tribunals which exercise criminal
jurisdiction in international law. Moreover, the International Military Tri-
bunal went beyond the minimum standards of most legal systems by requir-
ing proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 558.
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induced 'neutral' states to assume the duty of doing justice to the
Nazis. 24
The situation is no better today. Failure of the United Nations
to establish a judicial forum with jurisdiction over the type of crimes
heard at Nuremberg maintains this void in international criminal
law. "Truth is best established in an open judicial forum, and the
successful aggressor of the future is far more likely to permit his-
tory quietly to pass than to risk self-exposure by prosecuting false
charges before an impartially-constituted judicial body."2 5 Those
who may be charged with war crimes, in international law, are
entitled, since Nuremberg, to a judicial determination of guilt or
innocence. And such determination should be made by a judicial
body existing independently of the prosecuting authority.
The end of World War II did not, unfortunately, bring an end
of war to the world. "But if wars there must be, until the common
sense of man puts an end to them-or they an end to man-we should
provide now the means to achieve justice at the conclusion of any
such future conflict. We do not wish the guilty to go free, but we do
not want the accused unfairly tried, nor any pogrom unleashed upon
the peoples of a defeated state."20
B. People are Entitled to be Free from the Horror, Devastation and
Death Caused by Military Aggression
World society is still characterized by the concept of the
nation-state. We are all members of one nation, or another. The
nation, as a concept serves its citizens well by affording security of
life and manner of living agreeable to most. But the organization of
world society into nation-states also creates the historical setting
for wars. Nonetheless, within this setting it is individuals who initi-
ate and wage wars-and individuals, too, who suffer the conse-
quences. To characterize aggressive war as criminal is to confirm
the human right to be free from the misery which war inflicts upon
them.
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal declares
that the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements
or assurances)27 shall constitute a crime against peace for which
there shall be individual responsibility.
24 1d. at xxxii.
25 Id. at 566.
26 Id.
27 TMWC, supra note 1, at 11.
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Prior Covenants
The Charter was not the first international covenant against
aggressive war. The preamble to the 1924 Geneva Protocol for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes declared that "a war
of aggression ... is ... an international crime"; 28 a 1927 resolution
of the Assembly of the League of Nations stated that "a war of
aggression can never serve as a means of settling international dis-
putes, and is, in consequence, an international crime...";29 and the
Sixth International Conference of American States resolved in 1928,
that a "war of aggression constitutes a crime against the human spe-
cies .... ;73o
Pact of Paris
These statements along with similar pronouncements, culmi-
nated in the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of August
27, 1928-the Pact of Paris-which contains the following two arti-
cles:
Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the
names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war
for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an
instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.
Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settle-
ment or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of
whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never
be sought except by pacific means.Bl
Sixty-three nations, including all of the Axis Powers, adhered to this
Pact. By agreeing to abjure war "in the names of their respective
peoples," these nations recognized, even then, that freedom from
the consequences of military aggression is a fundamental human
right. Indeed, in the preamble, the parties declared that they were:
"[D]eeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of
mankind" and were "[p]ersuaded that the time has come when a
frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should
be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now
existing between their peoples may be perpetuated .... ."I' The
International Military Tribunal declared that this "solemn renunci-
ation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily involves
28 M. HABICHT, POST-WAR TREATIES FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNA-
TIoNAL DispuTEs 929 (1931).
29 L. OPPENHEIM INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (7th ed. 1952).
30 22 Am. J. INTIL L. 351, 357 (1928).
81 46 Stat. 2343, 2345-46, T.S. 796; 6 G. HAcKWORTHr, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 9 (DEPr. oF STATE PUBLICATION No. 1961, 1943).
32 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. 796.
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the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and
that those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and
terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing. '38
Charter Enlarges Upon the Pact of Paris
The Pact of Paris declared the human right to be free from
military aggression.84 The Charter of the International Military Tri-
bunal enlarged upon that right in three ways. First, it declared un-
equivocally that the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging
of a war of aggression is a crime in international law; second, it
stated that for the commission of this crime there would be indi-
vidual responsibility; and third, it extended that responsibility to
those who participated in a common plan or conspiracy for a war
of aggression. 5
Aggression. While renouncing war as an instrument of national
policy and committing the settlement of international disputes solely
to pacific means, the Pact of Paris did not, in so many words, char-
acterize aggressive war as a crime and the perpetrators thereof as
criminals. This omission was rectified in the Charter which describes
aggressive war as a crime in international law. 6 In the words of the
Tribunal: "to initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only "an
international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing
only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the ac-
cumulated evil of the whole.""7
To wage an aggressive war is, therefore, criminal in inter-
national law; to defend against aggression, however, is lawful, un-
less the means used to defend are disproportionate to the scope of the
attack. Many difficulties are inherent in determining whether an act
is aggressive or is reasonable retaliation against aggression. Such
difficulties do not detract from the basic principle that people have
the right to be spared from military aggression. In the case of Hit-
ler's Germany, the evidence of aggression was clear and convincing.
In other cases, ascertaining the aggressor may be much more diffi-
cult. This, of course, does not disparage the rule. Until war is
finally eradicated, the hard task of determining who is the aggressor
and of fixing a punishment commensurate with the crime must be
performed by impartial judicial authority on evidence fairly ad-
duced in open trial.
Individual Responsibility. Sovereignty has its rightful status
33 TMWC, supra note 1, at 220.
34 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. 796.
35 TMWC, supra note 1, at 11.
30 Id.
.7 Id. at 186.
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in international law. Wars are waged in the names of nations, not
of individuals. Yet the decisions for war are acts of the leaders of
nations. Those who have the power must answer for its exercise.
In the case of Nazi Germany, the power of Hitler and his cohorts
was absolute. After the Rise to Power, Hitler destroyed every ves-
tige of democracy in Germany.8 In other nations, not ruled by dicta-
tors, the ascertainment of individual responsibility is obviously more
complicated. The principle of individual accountability remains,
nonetheless. As the Tribunal said:
It was submitted that international law is concerned with the actions
of sovereign States, and provides no punishment for individuals; and
further, that where the act in question is an act of State, those who
carry it out are not personally responsible, but are protected by the
doctrine of the sovereignty of the State. In the opinion of the Tribu-
nal, both these submissions must be rejected. 39
The Tribunal referred to the Charter which states: "The official
position of the Defendants, whether as heads of State, or responsible
officials in Government departments, shall not be considered as free-
ing them from responsibility, or mitigating punishment."40 And, the
Tribunal concluded that "individuals have international duties
which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by
the individual state. ' 1
Conspiracy. Nor does the responsibility stop with the heads
of state who make the initial decision for war. It applies equally as
well to their accomplices in a common plan or conspiracy, and in-
cludes persons outside the government as well as those who join the
government with knowledge of the aggression. The Tribunal said:
Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself. He had to have the
co-operation of statesmen, military leaders, diplomats, and business
men. When they, with knowledge of his aims, gave him their co-opera-
tion, they made themselves parties to the plan he had initiated. They
are not to be deemed innocent because Hitler made use of them, if they
knew what they were doing.42
The Tribunal had little difficulty establishing a case of criminal
conspiracy involving Hitler and his immediate associates. Adolf
Hitler disclosed his plans for aggression at least as early as Novem-
ber 5, 1937, when he declared, in a secret conference, his intention
to seize territory for Germany on the European continent. "The ques-
tion for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be
28 HAmbs, supra note 8, at 44-57.
39 TMWC, supra note 1, at 222-23.
40 Id. at 223.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 226.
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made at the lowest cost," he said.4  And, "If the Fuehrer is still
living then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German
space problem not later than 1943 to 1945."" Certainly all who
were present at the 1937 meeting, or were apprised of its message,
became committed to the plan for aggression and were accomplices
to the attacks which began with the invasion of Poland on September
1,1939.
Aggressive war was illegal in international law before Nurem-
berg." Since Nuremberg, it is likewise, unequivocally, criminal.
Those who lead their nations into wars of aggression, and those who
conspire with them in the furtherance of such actions, may be held
personally accountable for the crime of aggression under inter-
national law.
C. People are Entitled to be Free from the Commission of War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Committed in the Course
of War.
The Charter defined war crimes as including, but not limited
to,
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or
ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hos-
tages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military neces-
sity .... 146
War Crimes
The specifications of the crimes charged in the Nuremberg
indictments were not significant departures from principles which
had previously been enunciated in international conventions. The
Soviet Union had not previously adhered to the Hague or Geneva
Conventions, however, and the Tribunal had to pass upon whether
this fact relieved the defendants from liability for traditional war
crimes in the Eastern territories. The question had already been
answered by Admiral Canaris, Hitler's Chief of Military intelli-
gence, in a memorandum delivered to the Chief of the OKW during
the war:
Since the 18th century these have gradually been established along
the lines that war captivity is neither revenge nor punishment, but
solely protective custody the only purpose of which is to prevent the
48 Id. at 190.
44 Id. at 191.
45 See notes 28-33 and accompanying text, supra.
46 TMWC, supra note 1, at 11.
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prisoners of war from a further participation in the war. This prin-
ciple was developed in accordance with the view held by all armies that
it is contrary to military tradition to kill or injure helpless people;
this is also in the interest of all belligerents in order to prevent mis-
treatment of their own soldiers in case of capture.
47
The Tribunal agreed with this interpretation of the law. It
found numerous violations of the traditional laws of war in the East
as well as in the West, for which it imposed individual liability on
those who ordered or committed the offenses. The rights stated
in the Charter against mistreatment of prisoners and related offenses
in time of war were sustained by the Tribunal as principles of
general applicability whether or not contained in enforceable treaties
or conventions.
Crimes Against Humanity
The Charter went beyond the typical war crimes in defining of-
fenses for which the accused at Nuremberg were to be held account-
able. During the war, reports came out of Europe describing
unspeakable atrocities commited against civilian populations.
Whether such reports could be sustained by evidence to be adduced
in open court could not then be foreseen. But, to assure that the
issues would be before the Tribunal, a category of crimes against
humanity was set out in the Charter embracing "murder, extermina-
tion, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population," and "persecutions on political, ra-
cial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal .... ." This was not
a new concept.
The Commission of Fifteen appointed by the Preliminary Peace
Conference to inquire into breaches of the laws and customs of war
during World War I found that Germany and its allies had vio-
lated elementary "laws of humanity" in the course of that war and
recommended that persons guilty of such offenses should be crimi-
nally prosecuted, although the two American members of the Com-
mission dissented.49 The Americans felt that "inhumane acts"
could not be punished by a court of justice, despite the provision in
the preamble of Hague Convention IV that the "laws of humanity"
constitute a source of international law governing humane warfare.50
The Nuremberg Tribunal had no difficulty in applying the latter as
a source of international law.
47 HARRIS, supra note 8, at 506.
48 TMWC, supra note 1, at 11.
49 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, DMSION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR 73 (Pamphlet No. 32, 1919).
50 J.B. ScOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCEs OF 1899 AND 1907, at 338 (1909).
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The inclusion of crimes against humanity in the Charter was
not primarily to incorporate standards of humane conduct into the
laws and customs of war, but rather to ensure that the unprece-
dented crimes against civilian populations by Nazi Germany should
be answered for by the defendants. The second World War did not
begin because of diplomatic misunderstanding, boundary dispute,
or similar cause of war found in past conflicts. It was a war of sub-jugation, ordered by Hitler for the purpose of acquiring living
space 1 in Eastern Europe. It had both racial and territorial objec-
tives. The Aryanization of Germany meant the elimination of the
Jewish population, gypsies, and even the mentally unfit. Similar
racial "cleansing" was involved in suppressing the occupied Eastern
territories. This racial war, which, in itself, produced the extermina-
tion of upwards of six million non-combatants, led to the formula-
tion of a new crime in international law-the crime of genocide.
Genocide and other crimes against humanity are punishable
under the Nuremberg decision only when connected with a war of
aggression. The decision could not go beyond the Charter, and the
Charter restricted crimes against humanity to those committed in
connection with other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribu-
nal. '52 Since only aggressive war, and war crimes proper were within
its jurisdiction, the Tribunal was forced to restrict the concept of
crimes against humanity to those committed in connection with war.
The Nuremberg Judgment does not, therefore, interdict genocide, or
like atrocities, as crimes in international law when committed inde-
pendently of war.
Although the concept of crimes against humanity, as construed
by the Tribunal, does not establish a new category of international
human rights, it greatly broadens the rights of persons subject to
mistreatment in war. Individuals may now be held personally ac-
countable for the commission of offenses against humanity in war
whether specifically proscribed as war crimes or defined as criminal
in international conventions.
CONCLUSION
In his final address to the Tribunal, Justice Jackson said:
It is common to think of our own time as standing at the apex of
civilization, from which the deficiencies of preceding ages may patron-
izingly be viewed in the light of what is assumed to be 'progress.' The
reality is that in the long perspective of history the present century
will not hold an admirable position, unless its second half is to redeem
51 HARS, supra note 8, at 66.
52 TMWC, supra note 1, at 11.
[Vol. 12
NUREMBERG AND HUMAN RIGHTS
its first. These two-score years in the twentieth century will be recorded
in the book of years as one of the most bloody in all annals. Two
World Wars have left a legacy of dead which number more than all
the armies engaged in any war that made ancient or medieval history.
No half-century ever witnessed slaughter on such a scale, such cruel-
ties and inhumanities, such wholesale deportations of peoples into slav-
ery, such annihilations of minorities. The terror of Torquemada pales
before the Nazi Inquisition. These deeds are overshadowing historical
facts by which generations to come will remember this decade. If we
cannot eliminate the causes and prevent the repetition of these barbaric
events, it is not an irresponsible prophecy to say that this twentieth
century may yet succeed in bringing the doom of civilization.
53
The causes of these events, so eloquently described by Justice
Jackson, have not been eliminated. The era of peace has not yet de-
scended upon the world. A threat of war hangs over almost every
continent, and war itself is waged every day somewhere in the
world. Armaments are more wide-spread, and more destructive, than
ever before in history. Even small nations may now possess the
ultimate in power-to-destroy. And the same consequences of war
prevail now, as in the past-concentration camps, up-rooted popu-
lations, forced labor, killings and torture, wreckage of homes, de-
struction of property.
Nor has the United Nations proven equal to the task of keeping
the peace. Disarmament has not been attained in adequate measure;
police-keeping forces have not been established in sufficient numbers;
and the judicial process has not been properly utilized to resolve
disputes, dispense justice, or punish wrong-doers. We should be
striving now to make the International Court of Justice a more
useful instrumentality in settling disputes among major powers, to
establish regional international courts for resolving controversies
among regional states, and to create an international court of crim-
inal justice as an independent body or as a division of the Inter-
national Court of Justice with jurisdiction over individuals for crimes
committed by them under international law.
It is hard to understand why, when all peoples throughout the
world, yearn for peace, it is so difficult to avoid war. We are coming
to the acceptance of the proposition that the maintenance of peace is
of greater importance than the prevalence of social and economic
systems. But demands for territory and political adjustments will
continue to give rise to military threats. There appear to be some
issues, presently irresolvable by legal means, which are more pre-
cious to some people, than peace.
Yet, the sentiment for peace ultimately must prevail in the
53 HARRIS, supra note 8, at 476.
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world. The United Nations could take a step in that direction, be-
yond the specific proposals for the judicial remedies discussed above,
by calling upon all nations and all peoples to observe, in the Spring
of each year, a Period for Peace, during which cease-fires would be
observed in all theaters of war and the attention of all world leaders
directed toward the cause of peace. Only when peace is universal will
there be an end to aggression, and war crimes, and crimes against
humanity, for which the Judgment of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg stands sentinel before the conscience of
mankind.
